The struggle for global power is no longer fought exclusively through military bases, economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure and territorial expansion. Increasingly, it is being waged through technology, artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure and control over the systems that govern modern societies.
At the centre of this transformation is a growing relationship between powerful American technology companies and the United States government, particularly in defence, intelligence and national security. Companies such as Palantir Technologies, SpaceX, Anduril Industries and Shield AI are playing increasingly prominent roles in technological systems with significant military and strategic applications.
Their rise raises a fundamental question for the rest of the world. What happens when the technologies that governments depend on for security, communication, surveillance and decision-making are controlled by corporations operating within the strategic orbit of a global superpower?
This is not merely a debate about innovation. It is a debate about sovereignty, accountability and the future distribution of global power.
When technology becomes an instrument of power
Artificial intelligence promises enormous benefits, from improving healthcare and education to strengthening public services and expanding economic opportunities. However, the same technology can also transform warfare, surveillance, intelligence gathering and political control.
Palantir, for instance, develops data analytics platforms used by government and defence organisations. SpaceX operates satellite communications infrastructure and provides launch services with strategic applications. Anduril and Shield AI develop defence technologies that include autonomous systems, surveillance capabilities and AI-enabled military applications.
These companies operate in different technological fields, and their products should not be treated as identical. Nor does their relationship with the US government automatically prove that Washington controls every system they supply. Nevertheless, their growing importance in national security raises legitimate questions about who controls critical infrastructure, who determines how these systems are used and what happens when the interests of a technology provider conflict with those of a customer government.
The concern is that technological dependence could become a new form of political leverage.
A country may possess its own flag, constitution, parliament and military, but its practical independence can be weakened if essential security systems depend on foreign-controlled software, satellite networks, cloud infrastructure or artificial intelligence platforms that it cannot independently audit, repair or replace.
In such circumstances, sovereignty may exist formally while remaining constrained technologically.
The new face of neocolonialism
Traditional colonialism relied on territorial occupation, political subjugation and the extraction of resources. Neocolonialism operates through less visible mechanisms, including financial dependence, unequal trade relationships and external influence over domestic decision-making.
Digital neocolonialism describes a related danger. Countries may become dependent on foreign companies for the infrastructure through which their data is collected, their populations are monitored, their communications are transmitted and their security decisions are supported.
The danger is especially significant for developing countries that lack the capital, research institutions and industrial capacity to build competitive alternatives.
African governments, for example, increasingly need digital systems to manage public administration, financial transactions, communications and national security. Partnerships with foreign technology providers can accelerate development, but poorly negotiated agreements may create long-term dependencies that are expensive or difficult to reverse.
Who owns the data? Who can access it? Where is it stored? Can a foreign supplier suspend access to a critical service? Can a government independently verify how an AI system reaches its conclusions? What legal remedies exist if the technology is misused?
These are not abstract questions. They go to the heart of national independence.
African governments must not confuse access to advanced technology with technological sovereignty. Buying a sophisticated system does not necessarily mean acquiring the knowledge, infrastructure or authority required to control it.
The military dimension cannot be ignored
The implications are particularly serious in defence and intelligence.
AI-enabled systems can help identify targets, analyse battlefield information, operate surveillance platforms and support military decision-making. Their use also raises concerns about accountability, the reliability of automated decisions, civilian protection and the possibility of escalation when human judgment is displaced by algorithmic recommendations.
Where a government relies heavily on a foreign supplier, it must establish whether it retains meaningful operational control, access to essential technical information and the ability to continue functioning if the relationship deteriorates.
It would be inaccurate to claim that every American AI-powered weapon is automatically controlled by the Pentagon or that every foreign customer is merely an operator without independent authority. The arrangements differ between companies, products and contracts.
However, the underlying concern remains valid. Governments must understand the extent to which foreign suppliers can influence the availability, maintenance, updating and operation of the systems on which their security depends.
No responsible state should enter a military technology agreement without examining these risks.
National security cannot rest on assumptions about the goodwill of a foreign government or the commercial promises of a private corporation. It requires enforceable safeguards, independent technical assessments and credible alternatives.
Artificial intelligence and the politics of control
The growing integration of AI into government operations introduces another challenge. Systems designed to analyse information and automate decisions can influence policing, border management, public administration and military operations.
When these tools are developed and supplied by powerful private companies, questions of democratic accountability become unavoidable.
Who audits the algorithms? Who determines the limits of surveillance? Who is responsible when an automated decision causes harm? Can citizens challenge decisions influenced by systems whose operations remain commercially confidential?
The concentration of technological power also creates opportunities for lobbying and regulatory capture. Companies with substantial government contracts may have significant incentives to influence procurement rules, defence priorities and public policy.
Such concerns deserve scrutiny through documented evidence, transparent procurement records and independent investigations rather than assumptions that every technology executive or government official shares a single political agenda.
The issue is not whether artificial intelligence should exist. It is whether its development and deployment will remain subject to democratic oversight or become increasingly shaped by a small number of corporations and powerful state institutions.
Religious leaders and free thinkers must join the debate
The debate over technological power should not be left exclusively to engineers, military officials, corporate executives and politicians.
Religious leaders, civil society organisations, journalists, academics and independent thinkers all have a role in defending human dignity, freedom of conscience, privacy and the right of societies to determine their own futures.
Technological progress should not become an excuse to weaken traditional communities, silence dissent or replace ethical judgment with unquestionable faith in algorithms.
Concerns about technofascism, a term used to describe the potential fusion of technological control with authoritarian power, should be examined seriously but carefully. The label is not a substitute for evidence. The relevant questions concern the concentration of power, the erosion of civil liberties and the absence of meaningful public accountability.
Religious institutions, in particular, can contribute an ethical perspective to debates about autonomous weapons, mass surveillance, digital manipulation and the treatment of human beings as data points to be processed.
Public opposition should take the form of peaceful demonstrations, public education, parliamentary scrutiny, independent research and lawful campaigns demanding transparency.
The objective should not be to reject technology indiscriminately. It should be to ensure that technology serves humanity rather than placing humanity at the mercy of unaccountable systems.
Africa must not outsource its sovereignty
For African countries, the stakes are considerable.
The continent has a history of political independence accompanied by enduring economic and technological dependencies. It would be a serious mistake to reproduce that pattern in the digital age.
Governments should scrutinise major technology contracts, especially those involving defence, intelligence, biometric databases, critical communications and sensitive public records. Security assessments should examine data ownership, foreign access, software dependencies, maintenance arrangements, contractual termination rights and the possibility of service disruption.
Where the risks cannot be adequately managed, governments should consider alternative suppliers, diversified partnerships and the development of domestic technological capacity.
This does not require an indiscriminate boycott of American companies. Nor should African governments simply replace dependence on one foreign power with dependence on another. The objective must be strategic autonomy, based on the ability to make independent decisions and protect national interests.
African universities, research institutions and technology firms should receive greater investment to develop local expertise in artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, data governance and defence technology. Regional cooperation can also help countries pool resources, establish common standards and negotiate from a stronger position.
Uganda and its neighbours should be asking difficult questions before adopting technologies that may become deeply embedded in public administration or national security.
A procurement agreement signed today could shape a country’s technological choices for decades.
Governments must demand accountability
Calls to suspend every engagement with American technology companies may be politically attractive, but blanket prohibitions can carry economic, diplomatic and security costs. A more effective starting point is a rigorous, transparent review of high-risk technologies and contracts.
Governments should commission independent audits of critical AI systems, disclose procurement arrangements where national security permits, strengthen data protection laws and require meaningful human oversight of consequential automated decisions.
Military AI contracts should contain clear provisions on operational control, access to technical documentation, security testing, liability, maintenance and continuity of service. Governments should also establish procedures for investigating suspected violations of national law, procurement rules or data protection requirements.
Where credible evidence establishes that a system compromises national security or violates legal obligations, authorities should have the power to suspend its use, terminate the contract or pursue appropriate legal remedies.
Technology companies must also be held accountable for their conduct, regardless of their country of origin. No corporation should be beyond scrutiny simply because it supplies a powerful government or operates at the frontier of technological innovation.
The choice before the world
The future of artificial intelligence will be determined not only by what machines can do, but also by who owns them, who governs them and whose interests they serve.
A world in which a handful of corporations control essential digital infrastructure would present serious challenges to democratic accountability and national sovereignty. A world in which governments use technological dependence to exert political pressure would be equally troubling.
But these outcomes are not inevitable. They can be challenged through transparent institutions, public scrutiny, international cooperation and investment in independent technological capacity.
The international community must establish clear standards for military AI, protect civilians from the misuse of autonomous systems and ensure that technological innovation remains subject to law and human judgment.
Free-thinking citizens, religious leaders and civil society must participate in this conversation. Governments must scrutinise their dependencies. African countries must invest in their own capabilities. And technology companies must recognise that commercial success does not exempt them from public responsibility.
The fundamental principle is straightforward. Technological advancement should expand human freedom, not diminish it. National security should protect sovereignty, not create permanent dependence. And artificial intelligence should remain a tool governed by people, not an unaccountable source of power over them.
The question is no longer whether technology will shape the global balance of power. It already does.
The question is whether nations will shape their technological futures themselves or surrender too much of that responsibility to corporations and governments beyond their control.