By Aimée-Noël Mbiyozo
European leaders may distance themselves from President Donald Trump’s hardline immigration tactics, but their own approaches increasingly mirror similar strategies.
Since the 2015 ‘migration crisis,’ Europe has pressured African countries to tighten border controls and accept returned migrants, regardless of whether such policies serve Africa’s interests.
Today, European governments are pursuing tougher migration controls through increasingly assertive diplomacy, even as they criticise Washington’s methods.
These measures are unlikely to reduce migration in the medium to long term. Instead, they risk deepening instability, weakening democratic accountability and reinforcing the very drivers of migration across African states.
On 2 February, UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper visited Ethiopia to strengthen cooperation on irregular migration from the Horn of Africa. According to the Foreign Office, around 30% of those crossing the English Channel by small boats in the past two years came from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan. In 2024/25, 99% of Sudanese and 87% of Eritrean asylum seekers were granted protection at first decision.
The visit aimed to curb irregular migration by strengthening partnerships with origin and transit countries, tackling smuggling networks and accelerating returns of Ethiopian nationals from the UK.
Agreements included closer cooperation between law enforcement agencies, alongside undisclosed funding commitments.
To address economic drivers of migration, Cooper signed a US$400 million Joint Development Agreement supporting electricity transmission projects and a job-creation memorandum with Ethiopia’s Finance Ministry. An additional £17 million in humanitarian funding was announced.
However, the UK did not publicly address Ethiopia’s role in the 2020–22 Tigray blockade and humanitarian crisis, nor the ongoing conflicts and persecution driving displacement across Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan.
Net migration to the UK has fallen significantly, from 908,000 in June 2022–23 to 204,000 in June 2024–25 — levels comparable to the 2010s. In the year ending June 2025, 670,000 non-EU nationals arrived, with only 6% crossing by small boat. Most arrivals (69%) were for work and study, while 96,000 claimed asylum.
Despite relatively manageable figures and ongoing labour needs, migration remains highly politicised in the UK, with disproportionate focus on asylum. Immigration has overtaken the economy as voters’ top concern, and calls for offshore detention and mass deportation have gained significant public support.
Recent reforms include proposals to repeal asylum seeker benefits, make refugee status temporary, extend citizenship eligibility from five to 20 years, and speed up deportations.
The government has also imposed visa restrictions and diplomatic pressure on countries perceived as uncooperative on returns.
The European Union is advancing similarly restrictive measures, including external detention centres, faster deportations, penalties for non-compliance with return orders and the use of “assertive migration diplomacy.”
Human rights groups argue that such policies risk undermining legal protections and humanitarian standards.
Spain, however, has announced a regularisation scheme for irregular migrants who have lived in the country for over five months without a criminal record. Between 500,000 and 800,000 people are expected to benefit, most from Latin America.
Since the 1990s, European countries have implemented more than 40 regularisation programmes, enabling migrants to work legally, contribute to economies and return home when necessary. Many of these approaches have now been abandoned.
With multiple conflicts and humanitarian crises affecting Africa, conflating asylum with irregular migration and pressuring African governments to prioritise detention and deportation may worsen instability.
European leaders must consider the long-term consequences of short-term political gains. African countries, meanwhile, should carefully assess and resist policies that undermine their own development and governance priorities.