The Horn of Africa remains one of the world’s most volatile regions, with Somalia at its epicenter.
For nearly two decades, the country has grappled with the relentless insurgency of Al-Shabab, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated militant group that continues to threaten Somalia’s fragile stability and the broader region.
Recent reports indicate that the African Union (AU) and Mogadishu have proposed deploying an additional 8,000 troops to address escalating security gaps, a move that reverses earlier plans for a troop drawdown by 2025.
This decision is not only prudent but urgently necessary to counter Al-Shabab’s resurgence.
However, it also underscores the immaturity of the earlier decision to reduce forces, a misstep that has emboldened insurgents and jeopardized Somalia’s precarious gains.
The Case for Deploying 8,000 Additional Troops
The deployment of 8,000 additional troops is a direct response to Al-Shabab’s alarming gains in Lower and Middle Shabelle, regions critical to protecting Mogadishu from terrorist attacks.
Recent reports highlight the group’s swift offensives, capturing villages within 50 kilometers of the capital and battling Somali forces for strategic military bases like Wargaadhi in Middle Shabelle.
These advances expose the fragility of Somalia’s security apparatus, particularly as Al-Shabab exploits the reduced presence of international forces following the transition from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to the smaller AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) in February 2025.
With only 11,900 personnel, AUSSOM lacks the capacity to counter Al-Shabab’s mobility and resilience, especially in rural areas where the group has regrouped.
The additional troops are essential to plug these security gaps.
First, they will bolster the Somali National Army (SNA), which, despite progress in training and equipping, struggles to hold territory without robust international support.
The SNA’s challenges are compounded by logistical constraints, as reinforcements often must traverse Al-Shabab-controlled routes.
An influx of 8,000 troops, potentially including contributions from regional partners like Egypt, will enhance ground operations, secure key supply lines, and enable more effective counteroffensives.
For instance, Turkey’s recent deployment of 500 soldiers, drones, and commandos to protect Mogadishu’s ports and train Somali forces demonstrates the value of targeted international assistance.
Scaling this support with a larger force could tip the balance against Al-Shabab’s hit-and-run tactics.
Second, the deployment addresses the funding and mandate uncertainties plaguing AUSSOM.
The United States’ opposition to transitioning to a UN-financed model has left the mission under-resourced, limiting its ability to sustain operations across Somalia’s vast terrain.
A larger troop presence, backed by AU and bilateral commitments, could stabilize the mission’s operational tempo, ensuring that Somali forces are not left to fend for themselves against a well-entrenched adversary.
Moreover, the troops would signal to Al-Shabab that the international community remains committed to Somalia’s sovereignty, potentially deterring further territorial grabs.
Finally, the deployment aligns with broader regional security interests. Al-Shabab’s activities extend beyond Somalia, with ties to other extremist groups like the Islamic State in Puntland and potential links to Houthi militants in Yemen.
A strengthened military presence could disrupt these networks, safeguarding critical maritime routes in the Gulf of Aden and preventing Somalia from becoming a hub for transnational terrorism.
The United States, which has conducted airstrikes against both Al-Shabab and IS-Somalia, would benefit from a more robust ground presence to complement its counterterrorism efforts, especially after losing basing rights in Chad and Niger.
The Immaturity of the Troop Drawdown
While the proposed troop surge is a step in the right direction, it also highlights the recklessness of the earlier decision to draw down forces.
The 2022-2025 ATMIS drawdown plan, which reduced troop numbers and transitioned to AUSSOM, was premised on the assumption that Somali forces were ready to assume greater responsibility.
This optimism was misguided. Al-Shabab’s recent offensives, including the capture of villages and attacks on strategic bases, demonstrate that the SNA remains underprepared to confront a battle-hardened insurgency without substantial external support.
The drawdown underestimated Al-Shabab’s adaptability, allowing the group to exploit security vacuums and regain footholds in areas previously liberated.
The decision to scale back was also immature in its failure to account for Somalia’s complex political and clan dynamics.
The country’s federal structure is fraught with tensions, as evidenced by disputes between Mogadishu and regions like Puntland and Somaliland.
A reduced international presence has weakened the central government’s ability to project authority, emboldening both insurgents and regional actors.
For example, Somalia’s offer of airbases and ports to the United States, contested by Somaliland, has strained internal relations, further complicating security coordination.
A more gradual drawdown, coupled with sustained capacity-building for the SNA, could have mitigated these risks.
Moreover, the drawdown ignored warnings from Somalia’s leadership and regional allies.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has repeatedly urged the United States not to withdraw its advisors, emphasizing their role in training elite units like the Danab brigade.
The premature reduction of AU forces, combined with the exit of Burundian troops due to disagreements over troop numbers, left Somalia vulnerable at a critical juncture.
Al-Shabab’s attacks on hotels, military bases, and even the president’s convoy underscore the group’s ability to exploit these gaps, raising fears of a jihadist resurgence.
A Balanced Path Forward
Supporting the deployment of 8,000 troops does not mean endorsing an open-ended military presence. The international community must pair this surge with a clear strategy to strengthen Somalia’s institutions.
This includes increasing funding for AUSSOM, accelerating SNA training programs, and addressing governance challenges that fuel Al-Shabab’s recruitment, such as corruption and clan marginalization.
The United States, which has invested heavily in counterterrorism in Somalia, should maintain its advisory and airstrike support while encouraging regional partners like Turkey and Egypt to share the burden.
At the same time, the mistakes of the drawdown must inform future planning. Any transition to Somali-led security must be conditions-based, not calendar-driven, with benchmarks for SNA readiness and territorial control.
The international community should also engage Somalia’s federal member states to ensure that security efforts align with local realities, reducing the risk of political fragmentation.
Conclusion
The decision to deploy 8,000 additional troops to Somalia is a necessary corrective to the security deterioration caused by Al-Shabab’s resurgence.
It offers a chance to stabilize key regions, support the SNA, and counter transnational threats.
However, it also serves as a stark reminder of the immaturity of the earlier drawdown, which underestimated the insurgency’s resilience and Somalia’s institutional weaknesses.
By learning from this misstep and committing to a sustained, strategic approach, the international community can help Somalia build a more secure future—one where its people are no longer held hostage by the specter of terrorism.
The write is a Ugandan Journalist with Passion for current African Affairs.
adamkungu7@gmail.com