The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a nation endowed with unparalleled mineral wealth, holding vast reserves of cobalt, coltan, gold, and other critical resources that power the modern global economy.
Yet, this wealth has often been described as a curse, entwined with decades of conflict, exploitation, and suffering, particularly in the eastern regions of the country. A persistent narrative has emerged suggesting that the United States and other Western powers, driven by their appetite for these minerals, intervene in the DRC not to foster peace but to secure access to resources at the expense of local citizens.
Historically, the DRC’s mineral riches have attracted foreign powers eager to extract wealth without regard for the well-being of its people.
During the colonial era, Belgium exploited the Congo’s resources—rubber, ivory, and later minerals—through brutal forced labor systems, leaving a legacy of underdevelopment and instability.
Post-independence, the Cold War saw the U.S. and its allies intervene to secure strategic interests, most notably through the CIA-backed assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 1961, a nationalist leader who sought to harness Congo’s resources for its people.
This intervention propped up Mobutu Sese Seko, whose 32-year regime facilitated resource extraction by Western corporations while plunging the country into corruption and poverty.
This historical precedent sets the stage for understanding contemporary U.S. involvement as a continuation of resource-driven agendas rather than a break toward peacekeeping.
In eastern DRC, where conflict has raged for over three decades, the exploitation of minerals like coltan, tin, tantalum, and gold—collectively known as the 3TGs—has been a significant driver of violence. Armed groups, including the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels, control mining sites, using the profits to sustain their operations.
The United Nations Group of Experts has repeatedly documented how these minerals are smuggled out of the DRC, often through neighboring Rwanda and Uganda, before entering global supply chains that feed Western markets.
For instance, the takeover of the Rubaya tantalum mine by M23 in April 2024 exemplifies how armed groups profit from mineral-rich areas, generating an estimated $800,000 monthly from taxation alone, according to UN estimates.
Rather than decisively curbing this illicit trade, U.S. policies and interventions have often appeared to prioritize securing access to these minerals over dismantling the conflict economy.
The U.S. Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, specifically Section 1502, mandated companies to disclose their use of conflict minerals from the DRC and adjoining countries, ostensibly to promote peace by cutting off funding to armed groups. However, evidence suggests this measure has fallen short of its stated goal.
A 2024 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found no empirical evidence that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) disclosure rule reduced violence in eastern DRC.
Instead, it noted a spread of violence around informal gold mining sites, partly because gold—highly valuable and difficult to trace—remains a lucrative target for armed groups.
The rule’s focus on corporate due diligence, rather than addressing the root causes of conflict such as weak governance or regional interference, suggests a superficial commitment to peace that conveniently aligns with maintaining mineral supply chains for U.S. companies.
Recent developments further underscore the resource-centric nature of U.S. engagement. In early 2025, DRC President Félix Tshisekedi reportedly offered the United States a minerals-for-security deal, seeking military assistance to counter the advancing M23 rebels in exchange for access to strategic resources like cobalt and lithium.
This proposal, highlighted in outlets like The New York Times and BBC News, reflects a transactional approach reminiscent of historical exploitation patterns. The U.S., facing competition from China, which dominates the DRC’s mineral sector with over 90% of its cobalt exports, appears eager to counter Beijing’s influence.
The U.S. willingness to entertain such an arrangement, rather than pushing for comprehensive peacebuilding, suggests a strategic focus on securing minerals critical for batteries, defense, and technology over ensuring lasting stability.
Moreover, the U.S. has historically been reluctant to confront Rwanda, a key player in the eastern DRC conflict and a conduit for smuggled minerals. Despite UN reports documenting Rwanda’s support for M23—including up to 4,000 Rwandan troops fighting alongside the group in 2024—the U.S. has issued statements of concern but stopped short of imposing significant sanctions or military pressure.
This hesitance contrasts with the U.S.’s robust interventions elsewhere when strategic interests are at stake, such as in Iraq or Libya. The 2024 U.S. State Department statement expressing “deep concern” about the illicit mineral trade through Rwanda and Uganda notably avoided direct action, focusing instead on due diligence guidance for private companies.
This soft approach implies a tacit acceptance of the status quo, where minerals continue flowing to global markets, including the U.S., even as conflict persists.
The argument that the U.S. fans conflict to exploit resources finds traction in the broader geopolitical context. Eastern DRC’s instability serves as a convenient justification for foreign intervention, whether through military aid, peacekeeping missions, or economic partnerships.
The presence of over 100 armed groups, as noted by Amnesty International, creates a fragmented landscape where no single entity can monopolize resource control, allowing external actors to negotiate with various factions or states like Rwanda to access minerals.
The GAO’s 2022 report highlighted how armed groups and Congolese security forces alike perpetuate violence, yet U.S. policy has not targeted the structural drivers—ethnic tensions, corruption, or foreign interference—beyond symbolic measures.
This selective focus suggests that maintaining a manageable level of chaos may be preferable to resolving it, as it keeps the DRC dependent and open to foreign influence.
Critics might argue that U.S. interventions, such as support for the UN peacekeeping mission MONUSCO or the SEC disclosure rule, demonstrate a commitment to peace.
However, MONUSCO’s limited success—evidenced by its inability to halt M23’s 2025 advance on Goma—and the SEC rule’s failure to reduce violence undermine this claim.
The human cost of this approach is staggering. Over 7 million people have been displaced in eastern DRC, and millions more endure poverty despite the country’s $24 trillion in untapped resources.
The Global Witness campaign has long highlighted how minerals mined under conditions of violence and slavery end up in Western consumer goods, yet U.S. policy has not disrupted this supply chain.
Instead, initiatives like the proposed Lobito Corridor project, aimed at transporting minerals from central Africa to Angola, signal a focus on extraction efficiency rather than local development.
In conclusion, U.S. intervention in the DRC appears driven by a desire to exploit its mineral wealth rather than ensure peace for its citizens.
While the U.S. frames its actions as promoting security, the evidence suggests a replay of colonial dynamics, where Congo’s riches enrich foreign powers while its people bear the burden of conflict and deprivation.
The writer is a Ugandan Journalist based in Kampala.
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