With elections for new commissioners in February 2025, member states must decide what kind of commission they want.
One weakness of the African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063 economic growth and development plan is that it focuses more on goals than how to achieve them.
In particular, the plan says little about the structure of the AU Commission, which is the secretariat and engine that implements the continental body’s agenda.
Adopted in 2014, ‘Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want’ sets the framework for most AU programmes and development projects.
Now, 20 years after the AU was formed and a decade after Agenda 2063’s launch, the organisation must redefine the roles, prerogatives and ambitions of the AU Commission.
What kind of commission is needed to achieve Agenda 2063, and who should inform this decision? As the AU becomes a foreign policy actor – with its admission into the G20 in 2023 – it is important to reflect on a long-term vision for the commission.
In this regard, the AU’s institutional reform launched in 2017 has been a missed opportunity. Rather than providing a clear vision for the commission, the process merely highlighted its stormy relationship with the Permanent Representatives Committee – the forum of member state representatives to the AU.
Member states perceived the commission as inefficient and badly structured, so the institutional reforms aimed to reduce its size by rationalising some departments.
Other goals included more financial accountability, greater efficiency, and a clear division of labour between the AU and regional economic communities (RECs).
As a result, the commission now boasts larger departments in terms of their scope, but with limited capacity and questionable efficiency. The division of labour between the AU and RECs has also not improved.
The reforms have not resolved the contradictions and ambiguities in the AU legal frameworks related to subsidiarity. This fuels competition between the AU and regional blocs, shifting their focus away from effectiveness to owning solutions.
As a result, the commission is sidelined during peacemaking in favour of regional blocs who struggle to pacify their member countries.
Few member states favour a more independent commission that actively engages in conflict prevention and engagements with RECs.
African states are protective over their sovereignty and emphasise the AU’s intergovernmental nature, so they prefer a commission with limited scope, mandate and resources; one that is more reactive than proactive and importantly, responds to their needs.
African countries are right in pointing to the numerous pockets of strategic and operational inefficiencies in the commission’s day-to-day management.
And fixing the commission alone won’t make the AU more efficient. However, as a central organ of the continental body, meaningful reform is vital.
The name change from secretariat to commission added little in terms of autonomy and efficiency. And while some elements of competition have been added to the selection of commissioners, regional representation appears to be more important than competence.
The AU Commission chair has no say in the choice of commissioners – they are all elected at the same time. And the chair’s authority over commissioners and ability to oversee their performance is stifled due to limitations on the chair’s functions.
Beyond its stated commitment to integration, the AU remains legally and politically strongly intergovernmental. It aims to increase cooperation among African countries, but regional integration is hampered by low levels of trade and scientific and cultural collaboration.
The AU claims to be people-centred and citizen-driven. However, creating a Pan-African Parliament and the recent drive towards youth involvement have done little to free the AU from its intergovernmental and elitist trap.
Ordinary citizens have limited experience of and with the AU, despite efforts in recent years by specialised agencies, such as the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention during COVID-19.
The AU is far from a supranational organisation with binding rules like the European Union. It is in fact closer to the United Nations.
The AU Charter, the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council, and Agenda 2063 all refer to shared African values.
But the mechanisms to disseminate and protect those values are either limited in scope or undermined by member states themselves. Regional courts of justice are facing severe headwinds from embattled governments who renege on their commitments.
As an elite project born from the ideology of historic Pan-Africanism, the AU has – particularly through its African Peace and Security Architecture – fostered cooperation among member states.
Stakeholders widely agree that this cooperation should be taken to the next level to avoid the total erosion of consensus among countries.
To renew that consensus, consultations shouldn’t be limited to the usual government and civil society elites. African citizens should be consulted to tease out their perceptions and expectations of the AU, its commission, and other agencies.
With elections for new staff scheduled for February 2025, member states must discuss the shape of the commission. It is time to ask: what is the nature of the AU Commission we want? African citizens should be given a voice through polls that could be run by the experienced survey organisation, Afrobarometer.
In its current form, the commission has to navigate contradictory trends. While the Pan-Africanist ideal has never been stronger in the rhetoric of African citizens and elites, the resurgence of nationalism helps coup leaders mobilise disgruntled populations.
Difficult conversations should start around key dimensions of African unity. Should free movement of people be a priority on a continent where border control and management are uneven? Is an African federation or confederation possible when member states exercise poor control over their territories?
African governments are unclear about the direction they would like the AU and its commission to take. Member states know the commission they do not want – but show limited interest in projecting it into the future.
Innovative thinking, wide-ranging inclusive dialogues, and the resolve to create an ‘AU Commission We Want’ are needed more than ever. Iss Africa