The Africa Forward Summit held in Nairobi on 11 and 12 May 2026 was presented as the beginning of a new chapter in relations between France and Africa.
French President Emmanuel Macron and Kenyan President William Ruto brought together more than 30 African heads of state and government, alongside business leaders, investors, young people and civil society representatives.
The language was deliberately different from the traditional Africa-France summits. The emphasis was on investment, innovation, digital transformation, green industrialisation, mutual respect and what France described as a new partnership with a changing continent.
But there is a bigger story behind the polished diplomatic language. The Africa Forward Summit must be understood against the backdrop of France’s dramatic loss of influence in parts of Francophone Africa. From the Sahel to West Africa, relationships that once appeared permanent have been weakened or broken.
French troops have been expelled from several former colonies, diplomatic relations have deteriorated, and governments that were once firmly within Paris’s strategic orbit have increasingly sought partnerships elsewhere.
France is therefore facing a strategic reality that cannot be ignored. Its traditional African model has suffered a profound crisis.
The question now is whether Paris is genuinely building a new relationship with Africa or simply looking for a new geographical and political route back into a continent where its old influence has declined.
For decades, French engagement with Africa was heavily concentrated in Francophone countries. France had deep political, military, economic and diplomatic relationships across West and Central Africa. Yet in recent years, that model has experienced one setback after another.
Mali is perhaps the clearest example. France deployed troops to Mali in 2013 under Operation Serval before expanding its military presence across the Sahel through Operation Barkhane. French forces were presented as a crucial part of the fight against jihadist groups. Yet following military coups in Mali, relations between Bamako and Paris deteriorated sharply. France withdrew its troops in 2022.
Burkina Faso followed. French military forces left the country in 2023 after relations with the military authorities deteriorated. In April 2024, Burkina Faso expelled three French diplomats accused of “subversive activities”, allegations that Paris rejected.
Then came Niger. The July 2023 coup marked another major rupture. The new authorities demanded the departure of French troops, and France completed its military withdrawal by the end of 2023. The French ambassador also left the country amid the diplomatic crisis.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger were not random countries in France’s African strategy. They were central pillars of French security policy in the Sahel.
Today, all three are members of the Alliance of Sahel States, which has increasingly positioned itself as an alternative political and security bloc and has sharply challenged the traditional influence of France and other Western powers.
France’s difficulties have not been confined to countries ruled by military governments. Senegal, one of France’s most historically important partners in Africa, has also moved towards reducing the French military presence on its territory. In 2025, Senegal took back control of French military bases as Paris ended its permanent military presence there.
Côte d’Ivoire, another longstanding French ally, also announced the withdrawal of French troops. In January 2025, President Alassane Ouattara said France would hand over control of the French military base in Abidjan to Côte d’Ivoire.
France has lost military bases in Mali, it has lost its military presence in Burkina Faso, it withdrew from Niger, its military footprint was reduced in Senegal and its military presence was reconfigured in Côte d’Ivoire.
This is not simply a series of isolated events. It represents the collapse of an old strategic architecture.
The reasons for this collapse are complex. The coups in the Sahel, deteriorating security conditions, popular frustration with governments, the failure to defeat jihadist groups and growing demands for national sovereignty have all played a role.
But France must also confront the consequences of decades of unequal relationships. For generations, the relationship between France and its former African colonies was built around a dense network of political, military, monetary and economic arrangements.
The system popularly known as Françafrique created a relationship in which French influence remained unusually strong long after formal independence.
The problem for Paris is that a new generation of Africans increasingly questions that model. The Africa Forward Summit itself was an attempt to demonstrate that France understands this changing mood.
Macron’s message in Nairobi was clear. He told African leaders that France and Europe wanted to stand alongside Africa in building an agenda for “peace, prosperity and independence”.
French officials also insist that France is no longer interested in the paternalistic relationships of the past. That is precisely the promise Africa should welcome. But it is also the promise Africa must scrutinise.
At the Nairobi summit, Kenyan President William Ruto delivered a message that deserves attention. According to Africanews, Ruto insisted that “the days of European dependency were finished for Africa”, arguing instead for relationships based on mutual respect.
Those words should become the standard by which every new Africa-Europe partnership is judged. Because the question is not whether France should cooperate with Africa. Of course it should.
The question is whether Africa will have enough bargaining power to ensure that cooperation genuinely serves African interests. The shift towards Kenya is therefore strategically important. Kenya is not Mali. Kenya is not Niger. Kenya is not Burkina Faso.
Kenya has a different history with France and a different position in global politics. It is one of East Africa’s leading economies, a major diplomatic centre, a regional security actor and a gateway to the Indian Ocean. Nairobi is also increasingly important to international investors and global powers seeking deeper access to the African market.
The Africa Forward Summit was the first major Africa-France summit hosted in an English-speaking African country. That fact alone tells us something about the direction in which Paris is moving.
France is no longer relying exclusively on its traditional Francophone sphere. It is looking east, and Kenya is one of the most important destinations in that new strategy.
The economic commitments announced in Nairobi were substantial. France announced a wider package of investments across Africa, while France’s development agency signed five agreements with Kenya covering renewable energy, digital connectivity, water and sanitation, and education. The agreements were valued at approximately €170 million.
The wider summit also saw commitments of approximately €23 billion in investments across Africa. These investments can be beneficial. Africa needs capital, infrastructure, technology, jobs and energy.
But the history of Africa’s engagement with foreign powers teaches a lesson that investment is never just about money. It creates relationships, influence and strategic interests which eventually shape foreign policy.
That is why African countries must look beyond the immediate value of any agreement and ask what the long-term consequences will be.
This is particularly important when dealing with natural resources. Africa possesses enormous deposits of minerals that are becoming increasingly important to the global economy and the energy transition.
The Democratic Republic of Congo has cobalt and copper. Guinea has bauxite. Zambia has copper. Zimbabwe has lithium. Namibia has uranium and other strategic minerals. Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire are major gold producers.
The question is whether Africa will continue exporting raw materials while importing finished products at much higher prices. Or whether African countries will use their resources to build industries, create jobs and develop technological capacity.
This is where the language of genuine sovereignty becomes important. Sovereignty cannot simply mean having a national flag and a seat at the United Nations.
It must also mean having the ability to determine what happens to your minerals. It must mean controlling your economic policies. It must mean negotiating investment agreements from a position of strength.
It must mean having the freedom to cooperate with France today, China tomorrow, India the next day and any other partner when it serves national interests.
Africa should never again be placed in a position where it has only one external partner. Diversification is not hostility. It is wisdom.
The experience of the Sahel demonstrates what happens when relationships become so deeply associated with one foreign power that political trust eventually collapses.
France’s withdrawal from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger should therefore be studied carefully by countries now receiving renewed French attention. This does not mean that Kenya, Uganda, Ghana,Nigeria or Tanzania should reject France.
It means that these countries should negotiate with France as sovereign states. The same principle should apply to China, the United States, Britain, India, the Gulf states and every other external power seeking a stronger presence in Africa.
The African continent should not be a battlefield for competing external interests. It should be the beneficiary of competition among partners.
That distinction matters. If France wants to invest in Africa, let it invest. If China wants to build infrastructure, let Africa negotiate the best possible terms. If India wants to expand trade, Africa should welcome the opportunity. If the United States wants to support African industries, African governments should engage.
But no external power should be allowed to become indispensable. That is the real meaning of strategic autonomy.
Macron himself appeared to recognise Africa’s growing importance when he declared at the summit, “Quiconque l’ignore aujourd’hui se trompe et renonce à son propre avenir”, meaning that anyone who ignores Africa today is mistaken and gives up their own future.
That statement is correct. Africa is no longer a peripheral question in global politics. The continent has the resources, population, markets and strategic geography that the world’s major powers increasingly need.
This is precisely why African governments must be more confident. They should not approach foreign investment from a position of desperation. They should approach it from a position of negotiation.
The danger is that history can repeat itself under new names. Old colonial relationships can be repackaged as strategic partnerships. Economic dependency can be presented as development assistance.
Resource extraction can be described as investment. Military access can be called security cooperation. And political influence can be hidden beneath the language of friendship.
The language may change. The structures may change. The flag may change. But the underlying relationship can remain unequal. This is why the Africa Forward Summit deserves careful attention. France may genuinely want to turn the page.
It may genuinely want a more equal relationship. It may genuinely recognise that the old approach failed. If that is the case, Africa should welcome the change. But Africa should also insist on evidence.
The test of France’s new policy should be whether African countries gain more control over their resources, whether technology is transferred, whether local industries are strengthened, whether African workers benefit and whether African governments retain full political and economic independence.
The test should also be whether France respects African countries when they disagree with Paris. That is where the true meaning of partnership will be found.
There is another warning here. France is not the only external power seeking a larger role in Africa. The United States is expanding its security partnerships. China has become a major infrastructure and trade partner. Russia has sought deeper security and political relationships.
India is expanding commercial ties. The Gulf states are investing in ports, logistics, agriculture and energy. Turkey is increasingly active across the continent.
Africa is becoming the centre of intense global competition. This creates a historic opportunity. But it also creates a historic danger. If African states compete against each other for foreign attention, external powers will continue to dictate the terms.
If African states compete with one another to offer the cheapest access to their resources, Africa will remain poor despite its wealth.
If African governments negotiate individually when they could negotiate collectively, they will have less bargaining power.
The future therefore requires a stronger African position. The African Union must become more effective. The African Continental Free Trade Area must move beyond declarations and become a real engine of intra-African commerce.
African countries must develop common positions on strategic minerals. They must invest in processing and manufacturing. They must strengthen regional value chains.They must improve domestic taxation and reduce unnecessary dependence on external borrowing.
And they must diversify their international partnerships. The message to Kenya and the other countries now being courted by France should therefore be clear. Do not close the door to France. But do not hand France the keys.
Welcome French investment. But demand value addition. Welcome French technology. But demand knowledge transfer. Welcome security cooperation. But protect sovereignty. Welcome diplomatic friendship. But maintain strategic independence.
The history of France in Africa is complicated, and it cannot be reduced to one simple narrative. France has supported development programmes, education, health and infrastructure across the continent. French companies have created businesses and jobs. French and African societies are also deeply connected through culture, language and people.
But it is equally impossible to ignore the political crisis that has unfolded across France’s former African sphere. The expulsion of French forces from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, followed by the reduction of France’s military presence in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, demonstrates that the old model has reached a turning point.
France now has a choice. It can genuinely rebuild its African relationships on the basis of equality. Or it can attempt to recreate old influence through new partners and new language. Africa also has a choice. It can allow history to repeat itself. Or it can finally negotiate with the world on its own terms.
The Africa Forward Summit was therefore more than a diplomatic gathering in Nairobi. It was a sign of Africa’s growing strategic importance.
It was also a sign of France’s changing strategy. For Kenya and other countries now at the centre of Paris’s renewed African engagement, the message should be simple.
Learn from Mali. Study Burkina Faso. Understand Niger. Watch Senegal. Observe Côte d’Ivoire. Do not assume that today’s friendship will always remain tomorrow’s relationship. Africa should cooperate with France. Africa should cooperate with Europe. Africa should cooperate with China, India, Russia, the United States and the rest of the world.
But Africa must never again surrender the power to determine its own destiny. The future should not belong to France. It should not belong to China. It should not belong to America. It should belong to Africa.
And if the Africa Forward Summit truly represents a new beginning, then the ultimate test is whether France is prepared to build that future with Africa as an equal.
That is the partnership Africa deserves.