Sudan’s war, by dint of sheer numbers displaced and hungry, is the world’s most devastating. Some 12 million Sudanese – more than a third of the pre-war population – have fled their homes.
More than half face acute food shortages, with parts of the Darfur region suffering famine. UN officials describe rates of sexual violence against women and girls as “staggering”. Increasingly, the country looks headed for violent fracture.
Fighting has engulfed ever wider tracts of the country. It pits the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – paramilitaries led by Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagalo – against the Sudanese army, headed by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and an array of aligned militias and Darfuri armed groups.
After longtime strongman Omar al-Bashir’s ouster in 2019, Hemedti and Burhan first shared power with civilian politicians and then kicked them out before turning on each other.
The army, without much infantry, relies on airpower, including foreign-supplied drones, and indiscriminately bombing areas under RSF control. It has turned to militias, particularly those mobilised by Islamists influential under Bashir.
Former Darfuri rebels have helped beat back RSF attacks on North Darfur’s capital, El Fasher. The RSF struggle to hold land outside its western strongholds but remains potent when engaged in attacks that suit its fast-paced, mobile fighting style.
Its forces often bring carnage as they advance. Momentum has swung between the sides. But neither looks likely to prevail.
The war also risks roiling Sudan’s neighbours. South Sudan’s oil revenues, which sustain its budget and the patronage that glues together an uneasy peace, have tanked since the main pipeline through Sudan shut down.
In eastern Chad, almost a million refugees are upsetting intercommunal politics. Chadian President Mahamat Déby’s decision to allow Emirati weapons to flow through Chad to Hemedti’s forces, seemingly in return for Emirati investment in Chad, has fuelled anger within Déby’s own powerful Zaghawa clan.
Outside meddling in Sudan has helped carve the Horn of Africa into competing camps. Emirati backing for the RSF (which Abu Dhabi denies, despite documentation by the United Nations and others) reflects its pursuit of influence and profit in the Red Sea basin.
Ethiopia, with close ties to the United Arab Emirates, has sought to remain neutral, fearing that the Sudanese army will aid Ethiopia’s armed opposition, but it may still get sucked in.
As for the Sudanese army, it counts on support from Egypt, which sees the army, despite its Islamist links, as a better bet than unruly RSF paramilitaries.
Eritrea, suspicious of the UAE and keen to have a buffer on its western border, is training Sudanese army-allied groups. Iran has reportedly supplied the army with weapons including advanced drones.
Saudi Arabia, with ties to both sides, has hosted talks in Jeddah with little success. After more than a year of war, the United States finally appointed a Sudan envoy, a welcome step.
For his part, Hemedti seems willing to talk but wants a new army – and a commanding role in it for loyalists, something that military chiefs, Islamists, and former Darfuri rebels bitterly oppose.
Nor can factious civilian politicians unite behind ceasefire terms and follow-up arrangements.
Worryingly, some in Sudan, particularly among Bashir regime acolytes, talk about partition, arguing that RSF abuses rule out coexistence.
They demand a carve-up, leaving the army in control of the north and east, including Khartoum, and the RSF holding the west and a patchwork of other areas.
Ending the war needs to be a higher priority. Ideally, Abu Dhabi and Cairo, given their influence over the parties, would rekindle talks they held in Bahrain in January 2024, the most serious attempt thus far to bring the sides together.
They should lay out a vision for power-sharing, even if it is only transitional. Many Sudanese reject the idea that Burhan and Hemedti, who have driven Sudan off a cliff, should play any role in its future.
But neither will halt a ruinous war absent a settlement they can live with.
As for the United States, President-elect Donald Trump shows little interest in Sudan and may defer to Gulf powers there.
That would be a mistake. Washington is best positioned to push key players, notably Egypt and the UAE, to forge a deal. A violent breakup of Sudan could destabilise the Horn, the Red Sea, and farther afield for decades to come.